This paper analyzes overlapping-generations models where natural capital is owned by sel…sh agents. Transfers in favor of young agents reduce the rate of depletion and increase output growth. It is shown that intergenerational transfers may be preferred to laissez-faire by an inde…nite sequence of generations: if the resource share in production is su¢ ciently high, the welfare gain induced by preservation compensates for the loss due to taxation. This conclusion is reinforced when other assets are available, e.g. man-made capital, claims on monopoly rents, and R&D investment. Transfers raise the welfare of all generations, except that of the …rst resource owner: if resource endowments are taxed at time zero, all successive generations support resource-saving policies for purely sel…sh reasons.
Introduction
Preserving intergenerational equity has become a worldwide political concern, and achieving sustainability is increasingly considered a relevant social goal. A major source of intergenerational con ‡ict is represented by the intensive use of natural resources in the production process, since over-exploitation represents a threat for the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Since Hotelling's (1931) seminal work, economists have pointed out several potential sources of the problem: over-exploitation may result from market incompleteness, excessive competition, myopic behavior, and the lack of incentives for investment in preservation. Accordingly, public intervention may be called for either to restore e¢ ciency (Toman, 1987) or sette con ‡icts between intertemporal e¢ ciency and intergenerational fairness (Howarth and Norgaard, 1990) . 1 In recent times, the attribution of property rights over natural resources has gained much attention in the policy debate. However, neither sustainability nor resource preservation are guaranteed when natural capital is private property. This result holds in general equilibrium models with in…nitely-lived agents (Pezzey, 1992) , and is furthermore valid when assuming sel…sh agents with …nite lifetimes (Mourmouras, 1993) : market valuation of resource assets can only limit the depletion rate to the extent that preserving natural capital is pro…table to agents currently alive. Consequently, achieving intergenerational fairness requires a system of transfers that redistributes income among generations: examples in the recent literature on resource economics include Howarth (1991) , Mourmouras (1993) , Krautkraemer and Batina (1999) , Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001) . The logic underlying these contributions is that of pursuing intergenerational fairness while preserving intertemporal e¢ ciency, and this typically implies considering lump-sum transfers. However, the welfare e¤ects of transfers can also be investigated from a di¤erent perspective, which is alternative to (but not con ‡icting with) the e¢ ciency-and-equity logic. Real-world policymaking is often constrained by institutional feasibility: lump-sum taxes have a limited application, and policies involving intergenerational transfers likely need the support of the constituency. Building on this point, this paper poses the following question. Consider an economy with overlapping generations where natural capital is essential for production. Suppose that, under laissez-faire conditions, lifetime utility of future generations will be lower than current welfare levels. Would sel…sh agents agree on a system of intergenerational transfers implying a lower rate of resource depletion?
Postulating a direct link between political support and individual welfare, this paper tackles the issue by characterizing individual payo¤s in a regime-contingent fashion -that is, lifetime utility levels of a given generation under alternative policy regimes -assuming that transfers are implemented through distortionary measures. The crucial result is that a higher degree of resource preservation may be strictly preferred by private agents, provided that a critical condition on technological parameters is satis…ed. More precisely, it is shown that if the resource-share in production is su¢ ciently high, taxing natural capital incomes to subsidize young generations guarantees higher lifetime utility for all newborn generations. The reason for this result is that a lower rate of depletion increases the growth rate of the economy in the subsequent period: if resource productivity is su¢ ciently high, this positive e¤ect on second-period income more than compensates the negative e¤ect of taxation, and agents will prefer non-zero transfers to laissez-faire conditions for purely sel…sh reasons. Moreover, this mechanism is enhanced by the presence of other assets representing individual wealth. Extending the model to include man-made capital, monopoly rents and R&D sectors, it is shown that the critical condition becomes less restrictive because the returns from these assets also bene…t from the positive growth e¤ect induced by a higher degree of preservation.
From a policymaking perspective, the private desire for resource-saving policies unfolds if young generations are credibly pre-committed. In this regard, it is shown that permanent transfers may arise as an inde…nite sequence of lifetime contracts: if young agents were asked to choose between permanent transfers and permanent laissez-faire, the former option would be preferred. In the absence of commitment devices, transfers may arise as political equilibria in sequential voting games when young agents have majority power or old agents are induced to cooperate by the presence of regime-switching costs. In all the above cases, the intergenerational distribution of bene…ts under resource-saving policies is not Pareto comparable with that obtained under laissez-faire, since resource owners at time zero bear the burden of initial taxation: similarly to Gale (1973) , if the …rst resource owner partially renounces to his claim over initial endowments, the transmission of this credit forward in time yields welfare gains for all successive generations.
The basic model
In line with recent literature, a sustainable path is de…ned as a path along which welfare is non-declining over time. The economy has an overlapping-generations structure: each agent lives for two periods, and enjoys utility from consumption when young (c) and consumption when old (e). Population in period t consists of N t young and N t 1 old individuals, with a constant rate n of population growth: N t+1 = N t (1 + n). Denoting by U t the lifetime utility of an agent born in period t, sustainability requires U t+1 (c t+1 ; e t+2 ) U t (c t ; e t+1 ) ; 8t 2 [0; 1) :
Denoting by R t the stock of natural resources available in the economy, we also de…ne no depletion paths as those paths satisfying
Our formal analysis draws on Mourmouras (1993) and Krautkraemer and Batina (1999) : in this section, we augment the Mourmouras (1993) model by considering exogenous technical progress; further extensions regarding man-made capital, monopoly rents and endogenous technical change are developed later in section 4. Prospects for sustainability and natural preservation depend on the intergenerational distribution of entitlements, which a¤ects the time-path of resource use, and in turn, the production frontier and consumption possibilities of generations yet to be born. In this regard, we assume a grandfathering process à la Krautkraemer and Batina (1999) : at the beginning of period t, the whole stock of natural resources in the economy R t is held by old agents. Part of R is used as natural capital in production (X), while the remaining stock constitutes resource assets (A):
Old agents sell resource assets A t to young agents at unit price q t , and receive a gross marginal rent p t for each unit of natural capital X t supplied to …rms. Quantities of resource assets and natural capital per young individual are denoted by a t = A t =N t and x t = X t =N t , respectively. While natural capital is destroyed in the production process, resource assets sold to newborn generations are brought forward in time: in each period, the resource grows at constant regeneration rate ", implying
Only young agents work, supplying one unit of labor services. The consumption good is produced by means of natural capital and labor, according to technology
where Y t is aggregate output, N t equals total labor units supplied by the currently young, and m t is the state of technology, representing a process that enhances the productivity of natural capital in each period: > 0 is the rate of resource-augmenting technological progress. 2 Denoting by w the wage rate, pro…t maximization implies
where y = Y =N is output per worker. Intergenerational transfers take the following form: young agents' investment is subsidized by taxing the income from natural capital of old agents, and …scal authorities keep a balanced budget in each period. Formally,
Equations (9) and (10) represent budget constraints faced by each individual born in period t, where d is the subsidy rate on investment in resource assets, and is the tax rate on natural capital income. Equation (11) is the government budget constraint, and equation (12) is the aggregate constraint of the economy. Agents are homogeneous and have logarithmic preferences: lifetime utility is U t = log c t + log e t+1 , where 2 (0; 1) is the individual discount factor. Equilibrium in the resource market requires
in each period. The consumer problem consists of choosing c t and e t+1 in order to maximize lifetime utility subject to (9)-(10): …rst order conditions read
2 In general, technical progress in Cobb-Douglas technologies is input neutral, and (5) may be rewritten as Y = X L 1 m, where the growth rate ofm = m is the Hicks-neutral rate of technical progress. Speci…cation (5) is chosen to emphasize that prospects for sustainability depend on the resource-saving e¤ect of technical progress ( ), and not on its global e¤ect of on output levels (mt+1=mt) -see Proposition 1; cf. Valente (2005) .
The temporary equilibrium of the economy is characterized by the following relations (see Appendix): the natural capital-resource asset ratio (z) equals
and the dynamics of the economy are described by 3
where v t+1 = (v t+1 =v t ) for the generic variable v t . Note that in equation (18) we have de…ned the augmentation rate as
In the following subsections we describe the laissez-faire equilibrium, and analyze the implications of intergenerational transfers.
The laissez-faire economy
Setting tax-subsidy rates equal to zero, it follows from (15) that the natural capitalresource asset ratio is constant over time:
The laissez-faire economy exhibits the knife-edge property: setting z t+1 = z t =z in (18), the net growth rate of output per worker is constant over time, and it can be positive, negative, or equal to zero, depending on parameters. With respect to Mourmouras (1993) , the presence of technological progress crucially modi…es the link between resource depletion and sustainability, determining possible con ‡icts among alternative social objectives. In fact, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for no depletion in the laissez-faire economy is 4z ";
whereas Proposition 1 A necessary and su¢ cient condition for sustainability in the laissezfaire economy isz ;
or equivalently
where = 1 1 is the individual pure rate of time preference.
3 Substituting (15) in (3) and (4) yields (16) and (17). From (5) and (6), y = m x so that y = [(1 + ) x ] , which implies (18) by (17). 4 From (16), no depletion (i.e. (21) and (22), the sustainability threshold z sus = increases with , while the no depletion locus z ndp = " is horizontal in the ( , z) plane. if < n, the laissez-faire economy may exhibit no depletion together with unsustainability; if > n, the economy may exhibit resource depletion together with sustainability.
Expression (23) is conceptually analogous to the long-run sustainability condition which holds in economies with in…nitely-lived agents: in the standard capital-resource model, optimal consumption per capita is asymptotically non-decreasing if the social discount rate does not exceed the sum of the rates of technical progress and natural regeneration (Valente, 2005) . Similarly, (23) shows that sustainability obtains provided that the joint e¤ect of and " is not o¤set by the impatience to consume ( ).
Whether sustainability conditions are more restrictive than conditions for no depletion depends on the rates of technological progress and population growth: no depletion per se does not guarantee sustained utility, and di¤erent combinations of parameters may determine sustainability, no depletion, both, or none of the two. The interrelations, and possible con ‡icts, between alternative social objectives are described in Figure 1 . Note that ifz = " and = n, lifetime utility and the resource stock are both constant over time. This special case, represented by point S in Figure 1 , satis…es most conventional notions of sustainability: utility is non-declining (standard de…n-ition), each generation enjoys the same welfare level (intergenerational equity), and natural capital as such is preserved over time (strong sustainability).
The economy with transfers
Proposition 1 suggests that if the economy is unsustainable under laissez-faire, a ceteris paribus reduction in z t due to intergenerational transfers will bring the economy towards the sustainability threshold. Balanced budget policies with positive taxes a¤ect the gap (z t z) unambiguously: from (15) and (20), the natural capital-resource asset ratio at time t equals
Assume that the policymaker aims at achieving a pre-determined level z 0 . Substituting (24) in the government budget constraint (11), the target level z t = z 0 is obtained by setting d t = d 0 and t = 0 , where (see Appendix)
For example, setting z 0 = " in (25) yields tax-subsidy rates that implement zero depletion of the resource stock. By the same reasoning, Lemma 2 Setting d t =z 1+z and t =z z(1+ ) for each t 2 [0; 1) implies z t = and U t+1 = U t for each t 2 [0; 1).
More generally, any …scal intervention that keeps z t below the laissez-faire levelz constitutes a resource-saving policy: lowering the natural capital-resource assets ratio corresponds to lower rates of resource use in production, or equivalently, to a higher degree of preservation.
Resource-saving transfers and lifetime welfare
We now compare the e¤ects of laissez-faire and transfers on individual welfare in each period: in this regime-contingent formulation, individual payo¤s represent the potential political support for resource-saving measures, as if agents were asked to choose between laissez-faire and intergenerational transfers during their life. Assuming that each newborn agent takes the history of previous regimes as given, we show that resourcesaving transfers in both periods of life may yield higher payo¤s with respect to persistent laissez-faire if a precise condition regarding technological parameters is satis…ed.
Regime-contingent payo¤s
Denote by t the outcome of an unspeci…ed political process, indicating whether laissezfaire or resource-saving transfers are implemented in period t :
The individual payo¤ V t of each agent born in t 0 depends on the two outcomes realized during his lifetime ( t and t+1 ) as well as on the whole history of previous outcomes H t = 0 ; 1 ; :::; t 1 :
Since agents cannot modify previous outcomes, H t is taken as given and the individual payo¤ of an agent born in T 0 can be written as (see Appendix)
Suppressing argument H, we set V T T ; T +1 ; H T = V T T ; T +1 and compute all possible payo¤s on the basis of (28). In particular, we will refer to V T (0; 0) and V T (1; 1) as payo¤s yielded by life-persistent regimes ( t = t+1 ). In the Appendix, we show that for any value of z 0 <z,
On the one hand, this result is intuitive: inequalities (29) and (30) imply that if agents could modify T +1 while taking T as given, they would have an incentive to avoid taxation in the second period of life. On the other hand, (29) and (30) do not rule out situations where sel…sh agents would prefer persistent transfers to persistent laissezfaire: V T (1; 1) and V T (0; 0) cannot be ranked a priori, so it is possible to have the interesting case
The explicit condition for obtaining (31) is derived below.
Proposition 3 Individual payo¤ s are ranked as in (31) if and only if
Condition (32) is necessary and su¢ cient to have V T (1; 1) > V T (0; 0), i.e. private agents strictly prefer life-persistent transfers to persistent laissez-faire. For a given discount factor , inequality (32) de…nes the set of all possible combinations of and z 0 implying V T (1; 1) > V T (0; 0). This set can be characterized by de…ning the policy index z 0 =z, which is determined by …scal authorities through the level of tax-subsidy rates: from (24), the policy index equals = (1 ) (1 d), and < 1 indicates a resource-saving policy. As shown in the Appendix, the welfare gap = V (0; 0) V (1; 1) can be written as
For given discount factors and policy targets, the gap function ( ) has an inverted-U shape: as shown in Figure 2 .a, there exists a critical value such that ( ) = 0, with being negative (positive) when the resource share exceeds (falls short of) this threshold level. In other words, if the resource share exceeds the threshold value, lifetime utility is higher with persistent transfers than under laissez-faire conditions. The economic interpretation of this result is as follows: reducing the rate of resource depletion in t implies higher output growth in t+1; if resource productivity is su¢ ciently high, this favorable e¤ect on second-period income o¤sets the negative e¤ect due to taxation.
Note that the critical level of the resource share depends on policy targets: as shown in Figure 2 .b, is higher the lower is . This is because is lower the higher is the level of transfers: if …scal authorities impose slight deviations from laissez-faire ( close to 1), the private cost of transfers is relatively small and condition (32) is likely to be met; conversely, if the policymaker is more inclined towards natural preservation ( close to 0), persistent transfers are more demanding and condition (32) is more restrictive. From a policymaking perspective, the result that permanent transfers may be welfare improving for present generations is relevant. In particular, ranking (31) suggests that while individual preferences about policy regimes can be in favor of intergenerational transfers, this private desire for resource-saving policies unfolds if generations are credibly pre-committed. This statement is investigated in section 3.3 and is similar to a standard result in the literature on pension funding: in the absence of commitment technologies, sel…sh agents would not implement pay-as-you-go social security systems (Browning, 1975; Hammond, 1975 ). An important di¤erence, however, is that resourcesaving policies involve an opposite direction of transfers (old-to-young) with respect to social security systems (young-to-old), so that commitment technologies must take a di¤erent form. In social security systems, young agents agree on …rst-period taxation only if convinced that they will receive second-period transfers; in the present model, instead, resource-saving measures gain unanimous support only if young agents receiving subsidies in the …rst period are induced to pay second-period taxes. As a consequence, full political support for resource-saving transfers requires either credible pre-commitment, or cooperation among adjacent generations. An example of a commitment device is provided by lifetime contracts (sec.3.3). In a sequential choice setting, instead, cooperation can be induced by positive costs of regime-switching (sec.3.4). Before discussing these issues, we complete the analysis of distortionary transfers by comparing …rst-best and second-best policies for intergenerational equity.
First-best and second-best policies
In order to assess the e¤ects of distortionary transfers on allocative e¢ ciency, a convenient benchmark is to assume that the policy target is to achieve intergenerational equity. In this case, the …rst best (Rawlsian optimum) requires two conditions to be satis…ed: …rst, all generations enjoy the same utility level U ; second, U must be the maximum utility level that can be sustained inde…nitely. The …rst condition requires constant income per capita, and hence m t x t constant over time (see Appendix):
The depletion path (34) implies a constant output level y =
Hence, along the …rst-best path, utility equals
for all agents born in t 0. If the government aims at implementing the Rawlsian optimum, a …rst-best policy is one that decentralizes the allocation described by (34)-(35). A crucial feature of this economy is that the …rst-best policy cannot rely on a lump-sum transfer scheme alone, due to the asymmetric intergenerational distribution of property rights over natural resources. Exactly as in Mourmouras (1993) , achieving the …rst-best requires expropriating natural capital of the initial old generation: at t = 0 the whole resource stock is nationalized; old agents at t = 0 receive a stock of …at currency that will be transferred to successive generations when acquiring output units; at each t 0, the government sells x t units of resources to …rms, and rebates the proceeds to the young generation via lump-sum transfers. This policy decentralizes the Rawls-optimal allocation, and lifetime welfare of all agents born in t 0 is given by (36). 5 The fact that, under the …rst-best policy, the initial old generation is expropriated is of particular interest here. In section 3.1, distortionary policies aimed at reducing the rate of resource use also imply a welfare reduction for the initial old. In order to compare the two policies, consider a couple of tax-subsidy rates that implements a constant-utility path. Such a policy is that considered in Lemma 2: authorities set z 0 = in each period, and obtain the same depletion paths (34). With x t = x t , output equals y t = y in each period. However, with respect to the Rawlsian optimum, consumption is lower in the …rst period and higher in the second: 6
5 See proof in the Appendix. With respect to Mourmouras (1993) , this Rawls-optimal program di¤ers because of the presence of technical progress, which has two interrelated implications: …rst, natural capital per capita x t declines over time, instead of being constant; second, while utility is kept at constant level, the resource stock Rt can be either declining, constant, or increasing: as explained in section 2.1, when production possibilities are increased through m, intergenerational equity and resource preservation are distinct concepts, and the long-run value of the resource stock depends on the gap between the rates of technical progress and population growth (cf. Figure 1) . 6 Equations (37)- (38) derive from conditions (A2)-(A3) in the Appendix.
From (36) and (37)- (38), lifetime welfare U (c ; e ) under this policy is lower with respect to the …rst-best:
Expression (39) is the welfare loss experienced by every agent born in t 0 under second-best policies. However, the two policies cannot be Pareto ranked: from (38), the utility level of the …rst old generation is higher under the second-best policy. Put di¤erently, if agents face an exclusive choice between the two policies, the young prefer the …rst-best scheme with nationalization of the resource stock, whereas the old are better o¤ under distortionary transfers.
Lifetime contracts
It follows from Proposition 3 that, when (32) is satis…ed, if agents are asked at birth to sign a lifetime contract requiring them to choose between persistent transfers and persistent laissez-faire, every agent born in t 0 chooses resource-saving transfers. With respect to this result, three main points should be emphasized. First, lifetime contracts embody a notion of credible commitment: under ranking (31), agents prefer resource-saving transfers as long as no regime switch is allowed during the life-cycle. Second, private agents would not enforce such contracts by themselves because resource owners at t = 0 receive no compensation: this is the '…rst-father problem' discussed below. Third, whether a sustainable path would be supported depends on the whole set of parameters. Suppose that lifetime contracts include the optionsz > and z 0 = . If condition (32) holds, agents choose z 0 and lifetime contracts support a constant utility path. As shown in Figure 2 .b, the technological condition is more restrictive the lower is : that is, the threshold is very high when the 'sustainability gap' (z ) is substantial, whereas conditions for an agreement on sustainability are less restrictive whenz is relatively close to . However, section 4 shows that when other …nancial assets exist in the economy, the critical threshold for the resource share is reduced, and its sensitivity to policy targets becomes less critical in this regard.
When considering an in…nite time horizon, the individual …rst-best payo¤ cannot be assigned to each generation, since implementing V t (1; 0) in each t is impossible. From a social-planning perspective, the relevant inequality in (31) is thus the central one, V (1; 1) > V (0; 0), which refers to life-persistent regimes. This in turn suggests studying the welfare time-paths implied by the sequences f t = 0; d t = 0g
We refer to these sequences as permanent laissez-faire and permanent transfers, respectively. Since the initial resource stock is owned by the old at time zero, a typical '…rst-father problem' arises: if transfers are voted into existence at t = 0, all successive generations gain from permanent transfers, but initial subsidies are …nanced at the expense of the …rst old generation. This generation bears the burden of the new regime without gaining from it, and welfare improvements thus pertain to newborn agents. On the one hand, the …rst-father problem implies that the two sequences, permanent laissez-faire and permanent transfers, cannot be Pareto ranked. On the other hand, resource-saving policies recall the logic of Gale-type intergenerational transfers: considering a two-generations pure exchange economy, Gale (1973) showed that the …rst generation can raise future welfare by renouncing part of its claim over the endowment to the bene…t of the second generation, which in turn transmits a claim to its successor, and so on. In our setting, transfers work in a similar way: the initial tax 0 p 0 X 0 amounts to the share of claims over natural capital not received by the …rst owner, and subsidies to the newborn bring the associated credit forward in time.
Sequential voting and induced cooperation
With lifetime contracts, resource-saving policies are supported by successive generations because agents are credibly committed to pay second-period taxes. An alternative interpretation of Proposition 3 derives from assuming a sequential process generating political decisions. Suppose that …scal authorities act in a representative democracy, and implement the regime voted by the citizens in each period : in this case, all individuals alive in period t face a discrete choice between laissez-faire (z t =z), and a certain amount of transfers corresponding to the policy proposed by …scal authorities (z t = z 0 <z). For a given voting rule, the sequence of depletion rates is determined by the outcomes of an inde…nitely repeated game. Similar games are used in the recent literature on social security systems and political economy (Cooley and Soares, 1998; Boldrin and Rustichini, 2000; Azariadis and Galasso, 2002) . These contributions study whether pay-as-you-go social security systems may result from political equilibria when private agents choose to create, maintain, or dismantle intergenerational transfers. A similar reasoning will be followed here, the main di¤erence being that the direction of transfers implied by pension …nancing (young-to-old) is opposite to that implied by resource-saving policies (old-to-young). In particular, the di¤erent con…guration of payo¤s in the present model implies the following Lemma 4 If (32) holds, agents support transfers in their …rst period of life in any subgame perfect equilibrium sequence.
The intuition for this result follows immediately from (31): in the …rst period, laissez-faire choices are ruled out by the fact that young agents prefer resource-saving transfers irrespective of second-period outcomes. The di¤erence with respect to socialsecurity games is twofold. On the one hand, Lemma 4 departs from the result, established by Boldrin and Rustichini (2000: p.51) , that laissez-faire outcomes can be part of an equilibrium sequence in pension games (see Appendix). On the other hand, Lemma 4 implies that in a growing economy (n > 0), simple-majority rules su¢ ce to obtain permanent transfers ( t = 1 in each t 0) as a political equilibrium, 7 in contrast with the standard result that the open-loop equilibrium in pension games features permanent laissez-faire (Hammond, 1975; Sjoblom, 1985; Azariadis and Galasso, 2002) . 8 More generally, the con…guration of payo¤s in (31) implies that coexisting generations never cooperate. To see this, consider a quali…ed-majority rule -that is, 7 As in Azariadis and Galasso (2002) , consider a simple-majority rule operating among homogeneous agents within each cohort: if the net rate of population growth is positive (negative), the majority of citizens is constituted by young (old) agents. Sincere voting thus implies that the political outcome t coincides with the action of the young when n > 0. As a consequence, when the critical condition (32) is satis…ed, if n > 0 resource-sacing transfers are voted into existence from t = 0 onward, whereas, if n < 0, the political outcome is permanent laissez-faire. 8 The intuition for this result is that, in pension games, young agents -the majority of citizens in a growing economy -do not …nance current pensions (young-to-old transfers) in the absence of commitment devices binding the next generation (see e.g. Azariadis and Galasso, 2002). if both cohorts vote for a given regime in t, this regime will be established; otherwise, the previous regime is maintained ( t = t 1 ). 9 In this case, any regime established at t = 0 becomes a self-sustained regime irrespective of the population growth rate:
Lemma 5 Under quali…ed-majority voting, if (32) holds then t = 0 in each t > 0.
It follows from the above discussion that intergenerational compromise lacks as long as old agents have no incentives to cooperate with the currently young. In this regard, it is worth noting that cooperative voting may be induced by a positive cost of regime-switching. More precisely, in the present model, a transfer regime already in place is sustained inde…nitely with unanimous consensus, provided that a regime switch involves a relevant cost for all agents. Note that the presence of regime-switching costs is consistent with two alternative interpretations: it may re ‡ect an exogenous (e.g. administrative) cost of reforms, or represent an 'over-rule tax'. In either case, the analysis of payo¤s is identical: assume that t 1 = 1 at some t > 0, and denote by t t 1 the welfare cost of a regime switch in period t. The new lifetime payo¤s for young agents in period t, conditional on t 1 = 1, are denoted by V t and read
V t (1; 1) = V t (1; 1) ; and the following result can be established:
and
agents born in t support transfers in both periods of life. If (41)- (42) hold at all t 0, setting 0 = 1 implies unanimous support for transfers at all future dates.
The reasoning behind Lemma 6 is that when the loss implied by a regime switch is su¢ ciently high, permanent transfers become the …rst-best individual payo¤: in fact, satisfying condition (42) implies V t (1; 1) > V t (1; 0), so that agents will vote for resource-saving transfers not only when young (in t), but also when old (in t + 1). With respect to this result, we can make three remarks. First, Lemma 6 does not assume that the usual critical condition be satis…ed, since condition (41) is su¢ cient to have V t (1; 1) > V t (0; 0), and is less restrictive than (32). 10 Second, the cost of regime-switching is assumed to be time-varying and regime-contingent for the sake of generality: if it is interpreted as an exogenous administrative cost, further assumptions yield symmetry in states (i.e. going from laissez-faire to transfers is as costly as doing the opposite reform) and stationary costs, in which case conditions (41)-(42) can be expressed in terms of exogenous parameters. Third, the cost of regime-switching can be alternatively interpreted as an over-rule tax, which essentially constitutes a commitment technology for young generations.
More generally, in the vast majority of sequential games, a paternalistic action at t = 0 is required to induce permanent resource-saving transfers . It should be stressed, however, that this variant of the '…rst-father problem' does not originate in the distortionary character of transfers: recalling the results of section 3.2, the amount of resources subtracted from the initial old is even higher under a …rst-best policy: if the …rst father faced an exclusive choice between …rst-and second-best policies, he would vote for distortionary transfers, in order to avoid expropriation of his natural capital.
Capital, monopoly rents and R&D activity
The basic model is now extended to include other assets, in addition to natural capital, which represent individual wealth. In this section, we derive critical conditions that are conceptually analogous to (32), in the presence of (i) man-made capital, (ii) monopolistic sectors, and (iii) R&D …rms developing innovations. For simplicity, we rule out population growth (n = 0) and normalize total labor supply to unity (N t = 1). Exogenous technical progress is also ruled out ( = 0), since we will introduce endogenous technical change under a slightly di¤erent production function.
Man-made capital
With = 0, the model with man-made capital is essentially that in Mourmouras (1993: sect.6) , with the only addition of distortionary transfers. Aggregate output is now given by Y = X 1 N 2 K 3 with constant returns to scale ( 1 + 2 + 3 = 1). Output per capita equals
where k K=N is individual capital. Agents born in t may allocate savings in assets representing either natural or man-made capital, with budget constraints
where i k t+1 is the interest factor received when adult. Tax and subsidy rates (d, ) are constant and set compatibly with balanced budget in each period, implying the aggregate constraint k t+1 = y t c t e t :
Utility maximization yields the standard Euler condition
whereas maximization of lifetime income requires
and the Hotelling rule
be satis…ed. The equilibrium propensity to invest is now a¤ected by the capital share 3 , which in turn modi…es the depletion index z t = x t =a t . Assuming a sequence of constant tax-subsidy rates, z t is constant over time, and given by (see Appendix)
Expression (50) is a quadratic equation in z with only one admissible (positive) root. With d = = 0, the same procedure gives the laissez-faire valuez. As in the basic model, equilibrium dynamics of natural capital and resource assets imply a constant rate of depletion of the resource stock
whereas output and man-made capital evolve according to 11
As shown in the Appendix, man-made capital and output converge to the same (constant) growth rate in the long run 
and the interest factor approaches the steady-state value
Expression (53) shows that a reduction in z increases the long term growth rate more intensively the higher the capital share 3 . This suggests that the presence of capital improves the e¤ectiveness of resource-saving policies in sustaining welfare over time.
To address this point, consider a policy target = z 0 =z < 1 which corresponds to a couple of tax-subsidy rates satisfying the government budget constraint (11). As shown in the Appendix, the condition for obtaining < 0 is now 1 + z + z present model, instead, capital productivity a¤ects condition (55) through 3 , and the critical threshold is far below 0.5 under reasonable parameters. In the example reported in Table 1 , we …x 2 = 0:4 and let 1 and 3 vary with a 5% discount rate ( = 0:95).
The critical resource share is 1 ' 0:23 with 'light policies' ( = 0:9), and increases with heavier tax-subsidy rates ( 1 ' 0:37 with = 0:7). The interpretation of this result is that the presence of capital enhances the mechanism via which …rst-period subsidies may compensate, in terms of utility, the negative e¤ects of second-period taxation: the reduction in resource depletion in t increases output levels in t + 1, with a positive level e¤ect on private returns from natural and man-made capital. The next section shows that this conclusion is robust to alternative assumptions regarding the nature of …nancial assets held by private agents.
Monopoly rents
In this section we substitute man-made capital with assets representing claims over future monopoly rents. This framework will be extended in sec.4.3 to include endogenous technical change generated by R&D activity. The supply side of the economy now consists of producers of …nal output (Y ) and …rms producing intermediate products (B) . 
where 1 + 2 + 3 = 1. Each variety is produced by a monopolist with unit production cost. Denoting by p b (j) the price of intermediates, each monopolist maximizes pro…ts
B (j) taking the demand schedule of …nal producers as given. First order conditions imply p b (j) = 1 3 in each period, so that prices and quantities of intermediates are invariant across varieties. As a consequence, each monopolist produces
Monopolistic …rms are owned by the currently old generation. Old agents in period t thus receive the per capita pro…t rate
where t = =N and b t B t =N . Note that (57) and (58) imply that output grows at the same rate as intermediate quantities and monopoly pro…ts:
Each …rm producing a variety holds the relevant patent, and old agents control the exclusive right to produce existing intermediate goods. Since agents die after the second period, young agents buy patents in period t in order to run monopolistic …rms in t + 1. This is equivalent to assuming that young agents invest in singleperiod obligations of a consolidated intermediate sector, representing claims over future monopoly pro…ts. Denote by v (j);t the forward patent value, i.e. the value in period t of a patent exploitable to produce the j-th variety in period t + 1. Since pro…ts are invariant across varieties, v (j);t = v t for any j 2 [1; g]. The aggregate value of all patents in the intermediate sector is F t gv t , and individual budget constraints read
where f F=N is the per capita cost of patents. The aggregate constraint of the economy is (see Appendix):
Optimality conditions for consumers imply the Hotelling condition
where the implicit interest factor is de…ned as the gross return on assets
As shown in the Appendix, the natural capital-resource asset ratio is constant in equilibrium, and equals
A constant propensity to invest in resources implies a knife-edge equilibrium: the economy displays constant rates of resource use and output growth. In particular, since 
Similarly to the model with capital -see (53) -the presence of intermediates contributes to the magnitude of the growth e¤ects induced by resource-saving policies: transfers increase y by reducing z, and the exponent in (66) is increasing in the intermediates share 3 . The dynamic interaction between resource use and investment in intermediate …rms is as follows. The rate of depletion x determines output growth y , which is in turn the rate at which monopoly rents develop over time -see (59). Hence, reducing the rate of resource use sustains not only output, but also the pro…tability of monopolistic …rms that represent investment opportunities for young agents. We thus expect a positive in ‡uence of 3 on the critical condition for < 0. As shown in the Appendix, the welfare gap V (0; 0) V (1; 1) now reads = log 
wherez is given by setting d = 0 in (65). Looking at Table 1 , numerical substitutions suggest that, with respect to the model with capital, monopoly rents imply < 0 for a wider range of parameters: considering di¤erent policy targets ( ) and comparable values of input shares, the critical threshold with monopoly rents ( 1 ) is lower than that obtained with capital ( 1 ). In the next section, the model with monopoly rents is extended to study the interaction between resource exploitation, endogenous technical change, and intergenerational fairness.
R&D activity
The previous model is now extended to include a third sector which develops innovations: R&D …rms invent new varieties of intermediates, thereby increasing the number of monopolistic …rms operating in the economy. We thus obtain a variant of the expanding-varieties model (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004) , which includes overlapping generations and resource extraction. Aggregate output equals
where the number of intermediates' varieties, g t , is now endogenous and generally time-varying. The behavior of monopolistic …rms is as before, with pro…t-maximizing conditions implying p b t = 1= 3 and
From (68) and (69), equilibrium output per capita now reads
and equilibrium dynamics imply 
R&D …rms operating in period t invent new varieties that monopolistic …rms will exploit at t + 1. In order to develop (g t+1 g t ) new varieties, the R&D sector consumes h t units of output, and the innovation technology takes the form
where t , the marginal productivity of R&D expenditure, is a¤ected by aggregate spillovers generating endogenous growth. In the R&D literature, spillovers are typically formalized as knowledge-stock externalities, implying that current R&D activity is more productive the better the state-of-the-art at the aggregate level. In the present model, a convenient index for the state-of-the-art in producing new intermediates is the number of existing varieties in relation to output levels. Assuming a linear relation between the marginal productivity of R&D …rms and the state of technology index, the aggregate productivity of the R&D sector increases with the economy-wide rate of R&D investment:
where > 0 is a proportionality factor, and h m h t =y t is the rate of R&D investment determining, by (72), the rate of expansion in intermediates' varieties. Since pro…ts are invariant across varieties, the value of each new blueprint equals the forward value of a patent v t , and equilibrium in the R&D sector requires 12
From the households' point of view, R&D …rms represent an additional asset: R&D investment in period t allows young agents to run (g t+1 g t ) new monopolistic …rms in the subsequent period, obtaining higher second-period income through (i) additional monopoly pro…ts from intermediates' production, and (ii) additional patent sales to newborn generations in t + 1. This mechanism is summarized by the individual constraints
where h t is R&D investment per capita, and equals agents' expenditure to obtain patents for new intermediates: from (74), in aggregate we have
As regards revenues, non-resource income in (76) can be decomposed as
The last term in (78) is the sum of current pro…ts and patent sales of the g t …rms that already existed in t, while the term in square brackets is the additional income (pro…ts plus patents) generated by new blueprints, and thus represents the gross return to R&D investment. In equilibrium, the two returns must be equal, and the implicit interest factor is
From (68), (75) and (76), the aggregate constraint now reads (see Appendix)
Optimality conditions for consumers yield the Hotelling rule
and the standard Euler condition e t+1 = c t i h t+1 . As shown in the Appendix, the propensity to invest in resources is constant, and the depletion index z is recursively determined by (the unique positive root of) the system
where the marginal propensity to invest in R&D, h m , is constant as well. Hence, the equilibrium features balanced growth, and output per capita grows at the constant rate 13 Since consumption is proportional to output levels, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for non-declining welfare is now
which con…rms that prospect for sustainability are improved by endogenous technical change -here represented by the rate of expansion in intermediate varieties
The e¤ect of intergenerational transfers on the growth rate is twofold. On the one hand, positive tax-subsidy rates reduce the depletion index z, implying the usual mechanism: from (84), a reduction in z directly increases the output growth rate y , and this e¤ect is stronger the higher are the shares of resources ( 1 ) and intermediates ( 3 ) in production. On the other hand, taxes and subsidies also a¤ect the marginal propensity to invest in R&D, and thereby the rate of expansion in intermediate varieties (1 + h m ) . This second e¤ect is generally ambiguous, but rather unlikely to imply a reduction of output growth following a decrease in the resource depletion rate. 14 As shown in the Appendix, the critical condition for < 0 is now
with numerical results reported in Table 1 . For the di¤erent policy targets considered, the critical levels of the resource share in the R&D model occupy intermediate positions if compared with previous models: with R&D activity, the critical threshold 1 is slightly higher than that obtained with monopoly rents, but lower than that obtained in the model with man-made capital (cf. Table 1) . Notice, however, that a sustainability-targeted policy is more politically feasible with R&D activity: the reason is that sustainability conditions di¤er between the present model and that with monopoly rents -see (66) and (84) -and the growth rate in the economy with R&D is generally higher. Hence, achieving sustainability in the R&D economy involves a smaller deviation from laissez-faire (that is, a higher ) with respect to the economy with monopoly rents, which grows less and must …ll a bigger sustainability gap (that is, requires a lower ). As a consequence, the critical threshold becomes less restrictive for the economy with R&D …rms. 15 1 4 The e¤ect of a variation in tax-subsidy rates on h m is generally ambiguous since a variation in d and modify both the numerator and denominator in the last term in (83). However, an interior equilibrium with positive R&D activity requires > 1 (see Appendix: eq.A55), and this implies that possible reductions in h m would not reduce the rate of expansion 1 + h m substantially. The net e¤ect of a reduction in z on output growth thus remains largely determined by the usual mechanism induced by resource preservation.
1 5 For example, set 1 = 0:25, 3 = 0:35, and suppose that the R&D economy requires a reduction of the depletion index corresponding to = 0:9. Recalling (66) and (84), the R&D economy can be safely assumed to be growing faster than a no-R&D economy with monopoly rents. The latter economy thus requires higher levels of tax-subsidy rates to achieve sustainability, corresponding to (e.g.) = 0:7. Under these parameters ( 1 = 0:25, 3 = 0:35), Table 1 shows that the sustainability policy would be politically supported in the R&D economy ( R = :0003 with = 0:9) while it would not be in the no-R&D economy ( M = :0003 with = 0:7).
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Input shares = 0:9 = 0:8 = 0:7 Table 1 . The welfare gap under di¤erent policy targets (and = 0:95) in the three variants of the model: monopoly rents ( M ), R&D …rms ( R ), and man-made capital ( K : in this case, input shares read 1 ; 2 ; 3 ). The welfare gap becomes negative when the resource share (…rst column) reaches a critical threshold.
Remarks
The connections between the present analysis and related literature can be summarized as follows. Mourmouras (1993) uses the basic model of section 2 to show that competition may lead to over-exploitation of privately-owned renewable resources, and describes a set of conservationist policies implementing the Rawlsian optimum. A major di¤erence is the aim of the present analysis: our focus is the existence of situations where agents prefer transfers to laissez-faire for purely sel…sh reasons, without assuming a predetermined social objective. Second, we have studied individual payo¤s in a regime-contingent formulation in order to investigate under what technological and institutional circumstances agents would agree on a higher rate of natural preservation. Third, we have extended the model to include technical progress, monopoly rents, and R&D activity, obtaining insights about the intensity of the welfare e¤ects induced by a higher degree of resource preservation. All the above di¤erences also apply with respect to Krautkraemer and Batina (1999) , where the basic model is extended to include a stock-dependent rate of resource regeneration.
In the literature on resource economics, intergenerational transfers are also considered by Howarth (1991) and Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001; 2003) . In Howarth (1991) , uncertainty about states of nature implies that the Hotelling's rule is not necessarily met, and the competitive equilibrium may thus be ine¢ cient: considering a max-min welfare criterion, Howarth (1991) shows that an optimal scheme of intergenerational transfers allows the economy to obtain intergenerational fairness while restoring e¢ -ciency. Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001) consider a production economy where the resource stock has a positive amenity value, and show that a 'trust fund' policy, where future generations receive claims for the natural resource, ensures e¢ ciency and protects the welfare of all generations. In a similar model, Gerlagh and Keyzer (2003) show that conservationist measures may implement optimal allocations that would not be achieved through competitive markets. Apart from substantial di¤erences in the underlying models 16 , the common merit of these contributions is to show that fairness may be achieved through policies that also preserve e¢ ciency, in line with the view that intergenerational equity and intertemporal e¢ ciency are distinct, and not necessarily con ‡icting, objectives (Howarth and Norgaard, 1990) ). 17 As noted in the Introduction, this view is not challenged by the present analysis, which focuses on the di¤erent issue of individual motives for supporting resource-saving policies. In this model, distortionary measures bear an e¢ ciency loss with respect to the …rst-best policy discussed in Mourmouras (1993) -see sect.3.2. This policy can be easily reinterpreted as an implicit redistribution of property rights across generations operated in each period by …scal authorities, in line with the main …ndings of Howarth and Norgaard (1990) .
Emphasizing the role of sel…sh behavior, our analysis is close to the view that intergenerational exchange need not be linked to parental altruism, as recently argued by Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) and Rangel (2003) . The general question asked by these authors is: why should present generations invest in assets that are valuable only to future ones? Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) and Rangel (2003) use game-theoretical arguments to show that intergenerational transfers may arise as voting equilibria when dynastic altruism is absent. 18 In particular, Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) show that pay-as-you-go social security can be voted into existence by the majority, because the reduction in current saving implied by taxation raises future returns on capital, thus compensating the negative e¤ect of pension …nancing. Recalling Proposition 3, our main result hinges on a di¤erent mechanism: the reduction in the rate of resource use implied by resource-saving transfers improves production possibilities in the future, and the positive e¤ect on second-period output more than compensates for the negative e¤ect of taxation (provided that resource productivity is su¢ ciently high). 19 With respect to models of social security, the opposite direction of transfers in the present analysis (old-to-young) implies substantial di¤erences also from a policymaking perspective, since commitment technologies change. A social security system is supported only if young generations believe that they will receive second-period transfers (Browning, 1975) , and this generally requires an intergenerational commitment devicei.e. an institutional arrangement that binds generations yet to be born; in the literature on social security, this device takes various forms, such as social contracts (Hammond, 1975; Sjoblom, 1985) , reputational mechanisms (Kotliko¤ et al. 1988; Cooley and Soares, 1998) , or constitutional norms (Azariadis and Galasso, 2002) . Resource-saving policies, instead, are supported when young individuals who receive subsidies accept plays a crucial role in Howarth, 1991) and non-essentiality of the resource for producing output (Gerlagh and Keyzer, 2001 ). In particular, the fact that natural capital is not essential allows Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001) to consider zero-extraction paths with positive output, a possibility that is ruled out in our model. 1 7 Related approaches to …scal policy with overlapping generations are also considered in the related literature on environmental degradation. In a continuous-time setting, Marini and Scaramozzino (1995) derive the optimal abatement program assuming the Calvo-Obstfeld criterion for intergenerational equity. In a similar model, Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998) show that public debt policy can be used to redistribute in a 'fair'manner across generations the burden of taxation implied by e¢ cient abatement programs.
1 8 Rangel (2003) shows that positive expenditures in goods that only bene…t the elderly (such as social security) are necessary to achieve an equilibrium with e¢ cient investment in goods that bene…t future generations (such as clean environment and education).
1 9 Notice that the ampli…cation of the growth e¤ects of transfers, induced by the presence of additional assets in our model, remains di¤erent from the interest-rate e¤ect in Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) . As shown in sect.4, …nancial returns are raised by resource-saving policies because of the positive level e¤ ect on second-period output induced by a reduction in z.
to pay second-period taxes: this requires an intertemporal commitment device that binds a given generation in the subsequent period, such as lifetime contracts (sect.3.3). Further di¤erences with respect to the social security literature arise, as already noted (sect.3.4), in the context of sequential voting games due to the particular con…guration of payo¤s in our model (cf. Proof of Lemma 4).
Due to the …rst-father problem, enacting permanent transfers involves a paternalistic action at time zero, as no generation would sel…shly make the initial gift. As already noted, the logic is similar to Gale (1973) , with the major di¤erences that transfers are distortionary and yield welfare gains only if the critical condition is satis…ed. Nonetheless, Gale's conclusion can be readapted to the present context as follows: resource-saving transfers begin after the economy "has been running along for some time in the [no-transfers] equilibrium, but at time t = 0 some of the old people realize that if they are willing to give up ever so little of their second-period consumption, the economy in the future will move up toward [higher welfare for future generations]. (...) If this altruistic scenario sounds too unrealistic, one can instead imagine a central authority which levies an income tax on the old people in period zero and then sells this income back to the young." (ibid., p.29).
Alternatively, we can imagine a privatization scenario where natural resources previously owned by the State are sold at a lower-than-e¢ ciency price to young generations in period zero, and permanent transfers are then implemented. 20
Conclusions
This paper analyzed the welfare properties of distortionary transfers in a growth model with overlapping generations and privately-owned natural capital. In this framework, unsustainability and resource depletion are a likely outcome of excessive competition, and implementing father-to-son transfers generates a higher degree of resource preservation. Our main result is that all newborn agents prefer intergenerational transfers in both periods of life to persistent laissez-faire conditions, provided that the resource share exceeds a critical threshold level. The reason is that the reduction in the rate of depletion implied by transfers improves production possibilities in the future: if resource productivity is relatively high, the positive e¤ect on second-period output more than compensates (in welfare terms) for the negative e¤ect of taxation. This mechanism is enhanced by the presence of other assets, in addition to natural capital. Extending the model to include man-made capital, monopoly rents and R&D sectors, it is shown that the critical condition becomes less restrictive because the returns from these assets also bene…t from the positive growth e¤ect induced by a higher degree of preservation.
The welfare time-path implied by resource-saving policies is not Pareto comparable with that obtained under laissez-faire, because resource owners at time zero su¤er a welfare loss due to taxation of the initial stock. The private desire for resource-saving policies unfolds only if agents are either subject to credible pre-commitment, or induced to cooperate with adjacent generations. In the …rst regard, a succession of lifetime contracts would allow a central authority to implement resource-saving policies in the inde…nite future: if young agents are asked to choose between permanent transfers and permanent laissez-faire, the former option is strictly preferred. In a sequential-choice context, the lack of intergenerational cooperation implies that alternative commitment devices must be set, e.g. in the form of positive costs of regime-switching. In both cases, agents support resource-saving policies for purely sel…sh reasons, and a paternalistic action is required at time zero. These two features recall the logic of intergenerational transfers à la Gale (1973) : if the …rst resource owner partially renounces his claim over initial endowments, the transmission of this credit forward in time yields welfare gains for all successive generations.
Appendix
A. The basic model
The consumer problem. By (3), (13) and (4), the second-period individual constraint (10) can be rewritten as e t+1 = q t+1 (1 + ") a t ;which can be substituted in (9) to obtain
The individual problem consists of choosing c t and e t+1 in order to maximize lifetime utility subject to (A1): …rst order conditions for an interior solution imply (14). Substituting equilibrium prices (8)- (7) and condition (14) in individual budget constraints (9) and (10), equilibrium consumption levels are
Deriving equation (15). Substituting e t+1 = q t+1 (1 + ") a t in (A3) gives
From (7) and (13), q t+1 = m t+1 x 1 t+1 (1 t+1 ) can be substituted in (A4) to obtain
Now consider the system
where (A6) is the optimality condition (14), and (A7) is implied by no-arbitrage condition (13). Substituting (A2)-(A3) in (A6), and (7) in (A7) respectively gives
Substituting (A10) in (A5) gives eq. (15) in the text. Proof of Proposition 1. Under laissez-faire z t+1 = z t =z, which implies that U t is proportional to y t (see equation (A14) derived below). Hence, satisfying the sustainability condition (1) in the laissez-faire economy requires (24) and (11) gives 
By (18), log y t+1 = log y t + log
zt(1+z t+1 ) , and (A13) can be rewritten as
If the policymaker sets z t = in each period, (18) implies y t be constant over time and (A14) implies U t be constant over time. More generally, from (A14), any path with constant utility requires
Deriving expression (28). Given the initial endowment R 0 r 0 N 0 , solving (16) and (17) backward yields
25 Substituting (A16) in y t = m t x t gives
where
is a function of H t and is therefore taken as given by the agent born in period t. Expression (A18) implies that t+1 = t (1 + ) (1 + z t ) 1 , thus
Substituting (A17) and (A19) in (A13) yields
Deriving expressions (29) and (30). It follows from (28) that
V (0; 1) = + log
V (1; 0) = + log
V (1; 1) = + log
Expressions (29) and (30) in the text are proved as follows:z > z 0 implies
Hence, from (A20)-(A21) we have V (0; 0) > V (0; 1), because Deriving expression (33). From (A20) and (A23), the gap = V (0; 0) V (1; 1) equals = log
Substituting z 0 = z and eq.(15) in the above expression yields equation (33) in the text. The Rawls-optimal path. Along a Rawls-optimal path, (i) utility per capita must be constant through generations born in any t 0 and (ii) the constant utility level must be the maximum that can be sustained inde…nitely. As regards the …rst point, utility per capita is constant through generations if y t = y at any t 0, implying m t x t = y . De…ningx t m t x t , the Rawls-optimal path requiresx t =x = (y ) 1 constant. Multiplying by m t the resource constraint r t+1 (1 + n) = (1 + ") (r t x t ), and de…ningr t r t m t we obtaiñ
Equation (A25) displays a unique steady-state point,
Since > 0, this equilibrium is unstable. As a consequence, ifx >r 0 1+ theñ r t diverges to minus in…nity: in this case, the Rawlsian path is unfeasible since the resource stock becomes negative in …nite time. If setx <r 0 1+ thenr t diverge to plus in…nity, which is feasible but technologically ine¢ cient, since there would be waste of productive resources. As a consequence, the Rawls-optimal plan is to chosẽ x = 1+ r 0 , which implies x 0 = 1+ r 0 . Since x t must decline geometrically at rate to ensure constancy ofx , natural capital and the resource stock evolve according to (34) along a Rawls-optimal path, and output per capita is y = 1+ m 0 r 0 at each t 0. Given y , lifetime utility is maximized by consumption bundles c and e satisfying (c ; e ) = arg max n log c + log e sub y = c + e (1 + n)
Assuming an interior solution, the …rst-order condition e = c (1 + n) and the aggregate constraint imply conditions (35). First-best policy. The …rst-best policy is the same described in Mourmouras (1993) . At time zero, the resource stock is expropriated and a stock J 0 of …at currency is introduced in the economy as a lump-sum transfer to the initial old. Denoting the quantity of money per young individual as j t = J 0 =N t , the …rst father receives (and consumes)
where p y t is the price index of the economy. All successive generations face individual constraints
where s t is the lump-sum subsidy through which the government transfers all rents from natural capital to the currently young. Hence, consumers maximize U t subject to (A27)-(A28), obtaining …rst-order conditions
Since the government is implementing the depletion path described in (34), transfers to the young equal s t = y in each period: substituting this amount in the budget constraints (A27)-(A28) together with the …rst-order condition (A29), we obtain
which coincides with the Rawls-optimal allocation (35). Proof of Lemma 4. A history-dependent strategy for the representative agent born at the beginning of period t is denoted by t (H t ), mapping previous generations' actions into the choice space f0; 1g. In this case, t (H t ) becomes part of the history set a¤ecting subsequent strategies, t+1 (H t+1 ) = t+1 (H t ; t (H t )). A subgame perfect equilibrium is a sequence of strategies ( t ) 1 t=0 if and only if, for every t and every history H t , strategy t (H t ) yields an expected lifetime payo¤ exceeding that yielded by the opposite strategy t (H t ), i.e. V t ( t (H t ) ; t+1 (H t ; t (H t ))) > V t ( t (H t ) ; t+1 (H t ; t (H t ))) :
Now assume that (32) holds, so that (31) holds. If t (H t ) = 0, it is impossible to satisfy both (A30) and (31) since, by (31), all possible payo¤s with t (H t ) = 0 are always lower than all alternative payo¤s with t (H t ) = 1. Hence, when (32) holds, t (H t ) = 0 cannot be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium sequence (and, by extension, laissezfaire will not arise as an equilibrium outcome with growing population). This result is due to the fact that, in (31), V (1; 0) and V (1; 1) are strictly preferred to laissez-faire conditions in the …rst period. Pension games are di¤erent in that the relevant payo¤ is of the type (cf. Boldrin and Rustichini, 2000: eq.3 .5) V 0; 1 0 >Ṽ 1 0 ; 1 0 >Ṽ (0; 0) >Ṽ 1 0 ; 0
where 1 0 means young-to-old transfers. In this case, laissez-faire outcomes may be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium sequence since it is possible to set t (H t ) = 0 while satisfying both ranking (A31) and the equilibrium condition (A30) -see Boldrin and Rustichini (2000: p.51 ).
Proof of Lemma 5. When condition (32) holds, payo¤s are ranked as in (31). Hence, for any history ( 0 ; 1 ; :::), the dominant strategy for young agents is to vote for transfers, whereas each old in period t has incentives to vote laissez-faire for any t 1 . Hence, quali…ed majorities never arise, implying t = 0 for all t > 0.
Proof of Lemma 6. From (40), we have V t (1; 1) V t (0; 0) = V t (1; 1) V t (0; 0) t (1). Substituting V t (1; 1) V t (0; 0), it follows that V t (1; 1) > V t (0; 0) if (41) is satis…ed. On the other hand, (40) implies that V t (1; 1) > V t (1; 0) if t+1 (1) > V t (1; 0) V t (1; 1), which -from (A22) and (A23) -can be rewritten as 
Substituting z 0 = z and rearranging terms yields (42). This reasoning implies that if (41)-(42) hold at t we have V t (1; 1) > V t (1; 0) and V t (1; 1) > V t (0; 0). From (40), it also derives that V t (1; 1) > V t (0; 1). As a consequence, if (41)- (42) hold, the highest lifetime payo¤ for young agents in period t is V t (1; 1) , and the dominant strategy in the political game is to vote for transfers in both periods of life. By sequential reasoning, if 0 = 1 and the above conditions always hold, transfers receive unanimous political support from all generations born in t 0.
B. The model with capital
Deriving expression (50). As shown in Mourmouras (1993: p.264 ), the natural capital-resource ratio is constant in the laissez-faire economy with capital. From the government budget constraint (11), constant tax-subsidy rates imply z t = z constant as well. From the individual budget constraint (44),
where we have used w t = 2 y t and c t = w t (1 + ) 1 . Using the equilibrium condition q t = p t (1 ) and the pro…t-maximizing condition p t = 1 (y t =x t ), we can rewrite net expenditure in resource assets as
and substitute in (A33) to obtain
Substituting the pro…t-maximizing condition i k t+1 = 3 (y t+1 =k t+1 ) in the Hotelling rule i k t+1 = q t+1 qt
1+"
1 dt , and using the equilibrium condition q t = p t (1 ) and the pro…t-maximizing condition p t = 1 (y t =x t ), we obtain
Plugging (A36) in (A35) and using x t+1 (1 + z) = x t (1 + "), we obtain expression (50) in the text. Deriving expressions (53) and (54). From (51) we have
which can be log-linearized as (de…ning which yields (54) after substitution of (53).
The critical condition (55). Using c t = 2 (1 + ) 1 y t and e t+1 = i t+1 c t = where the term in square brackets follows from (75). Setting (76) at time t and substituting for q t a t yields y t = c t + e t + h t g t t + where we have simpli…ed p t x t = q t a t d from (11). Substituting monopoly pro…ts 
where we have substituted g t+1 = [1 + (h t =y t )] from (72) and (73). The only endogenous variable in (A54) is the marginal propensity to invest in R&D, h t =y t , which can be obtained as follows. Rewrite (75) as c t =y t = w t 1 (1 d) (1 ) z
